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Abstract: Recently, Shen et al. proposes their ID-based ring signature scheme.  Based 
on the scheme, they also propose their linkable and convertible ID-based ring signa-
ture scheme.  However, a universal forgery is found for their ID-based ring signature 
scheme.  Therefore, their linkable and convertible ID-based ring signature scheme is 
also insecure against universal forgeries. 
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1 Introduction 
Digital signature concept is first introduced by Diffie and Hellman [1].  Then 
Rivest et al. [2] proposed their digital signature scheme based factorization problem.  
Digital signature schemes should satisfy correctness, unforgeability, and nonrepudia-
tion.  Moreover, the digital signature on some message m can be verified by anyone 
using the public key of the signer.  Therefore, verifiers have to know who the signer 
is.  The signer’s identity is not protected at all.  However, the signer wishes to hide 
his/her identity but the signature is able to convince the verifier. 
Ring signature schemes [3] are proposed to provide signer anonymity for the 
signers’ identity privacy.  In the ring signature scheme, the actual signer first random-
ly selects an ad hoc group as a ring.  Then the actual signer generates the ring signa-
ture such that each ring member is also able to generate the ring signature.  If the 
probability distributions of ring signatures generated by the ring members are the 
same, then the ring signature scheme is unconditionally signer anonymity.  
Since the ring signature scheme provides signer anonymity protection for the ac-
tual signer, no one is convinced that the ring signatures are generated by the actual 
signer.  To overcome this problem, the convertible ring signature schemes [4] pro-
vides a mechanism that the actual signer can transfer the ring signatures to ordinal 
signatures to show who the actual signer is.  Moreover, the linkable ring signature 
schemes [5-7] just help the verifier being able to determine whether or not two ring 
signatures from the same ring are generated from the same unknown ring member. 
Based on the concept of ID-based cryptosystems [8], many ID-based ring signa-
ture schemes [9-12] are proposed.  In ID-based ring signature schemes, the actual 
signer only needs the identities of the ring members.  It is convenient for the actual 
signer to generate ID-based ring signatures. 
Recently, Shen et al. [13] proposed their linkable and convertible ID-based ring 
signature scheme.  They announce that their schemes satisfies anonymity and un-
forgeability.  Unfortunately, a universal forgery is found on their ID-based ring signa-
ture scheme, therefore, their linkable and convertible scheme is insecure against te 
universal forgery.  In the following section, the universal forgery is presented after the 
review of Shen et al.’ ID-based ring signature scheme. 
 
2 Our Security Analysis on Shen et al.’s Linkable and 
Convertible ID-based Ring Signature Scheme 
To propose their linkable and convertible ID-based ring signature scheme, Shen 
et al. [13] first proposed their ordinary ID-based ring signature scheme.  This scheme 
is reviewed first, then our attack on the scheme is presented.  In Shen et al.’s scheme, 
there is a trusted party, the key generator center (KGC), is responsible to generate the 
pubic system parameters and public functions.  Any user Ui has to submit their identi-
ty IDi to KGC for his/her registration.  Then the user obtains his/her private key from 
the KGC through secure channels. 
KGC first chooses a public prime number q and constructs a public bilinear pair-
ing e: G1G1 G2, where (G1, +) is an addition group with the prime order q and (G2, 
) is a multiplication group with the prime order q.  The bilinear pairing should satisfy 
three requirements:  
Bilinearity:  For any P, Q, RG1, e(P+Q, R)= e(P, R)e(Q, R) and e(P, R+Q)= e(P, 
R)e(P, Q), 
Non-degeneracy: There exist some P, QG1 such that e(P, Q) 1, and  
Efficient computation:  There is some polynomial-time algorithm to perform the 
pairing function e [13]. 
Then KGC selects a public generator PG1 and constructs two public hash functions 
H1:{0, 1}*G1 and H2:{0, 1}*Zq*= {1, 2, 3, …, q-1}.  Then KGC randomly 
chooses its private key xZq* and computes its public key Ppub= xP. 
For the registered user Ui with IDi, KGC generates and securely sends his/her 
private key Si=xH1(IDi) to him/her.  Then Ui’s signature can be validated by using 
H1(IDi). 
Without losing generality, suppose that the signer U0 wants to generate a ring 
signature on the message m.  The signer U0 performs the following procedure to gen-
eration ring signature on the message m with n randomly choosing ring members to 
protect who the actual signer is. 
Step 1: Choose the ring members U1, U2, U3, …, and, Un-1.   
Step 2: Choose a random secrete integer tZq* and AG1, and compute P'=tP 
and c0+1=H2(L||m||e(A,P)), where L= (ID0, ID1, ID2, …, IDn-1). 
Step 3: Select an random element RiG1 and compute ci+1 mod n= H2(L||m|| 
e(Ri,P)e(ciH1(IDi), Ppub+P')) for i= 1, 2, 3, 4, …, n-1. 
Step 4: Compute R0= A-c0(S0+tH1(ID0)). 
Then the ring signature on the message m is =(P', c0, (R0, R1, R2,…, Rn-1). 
To verify the ring signature =(P', c0, (R0, R1, R2,…, Rn-1) on the message m, the 
verifier computes ci+1 mod n= H2(L||m||e(Ri,P)e(ciH1(IDi), Ppub+P')) for i= 0, 1, 2, …, n-1 
and then checks whether or not the computed c0 is equal to the given c0 in the ring 
signature .  If the computed and the given c0 are the same, the ring signature is legal. 
Our Universal Forgery 
The forgery procedure shows that Shen et al.’s scheme is universally forgeable.  
Suppose that the forger wants to forge the ring signature on the message m for the 
ring {ID0, ID1, ID2, …, IDn-1}, the forger performs the forgery procedure. 
Step 1: Choose a random secrete integer kZq* and AG1, and compute P"= kP 
and c0+1=H2(L||m||e(A,P)), where L= (ID0, ID1, ID2, …, IDn-1). 
Step 2: Select an random element RiG1 and compute ci+1 mod n= H2(L||m|| 
e(Ri,P)e(ciH1(IDi), P")) for i= 1, 2, 3, 4, …, n-1. 
Step 3: Compute R0= A-kc0H1(ID0) and P'= P"-Ppub. 
Then the forged ring signature on the message m is = (P', c0, (R0, R1, R2,…, Rn-
1) which passes the verification.  It is easy to see that the e(A,P)= e(R0+ kc0H1(ID0), 
P)= e(R0, P)e(kc0H1(ID0), P)= e(R0, P)e(c0H1(ID0), kP)= e(R0, P)e(c0H1(ID0), P")= 
e(R0, P)e(c0H1(ID0), Ppub+P').  It is also easy to find that ci+1 mod n= H2(L||m|| e(Ri, 
P)e(ciH1(IDi), P"))= H2(L||m|| e(Ri,P)e(ciH1(IDi), Ppub+P'))  for i= 0, 1, 2, …, n-1. 
Because our forgery can be applied on any message the forger wants, our for-
gery is a universal forgery.  Moreover, our forgery needs no collection of signatures 
and message pairs, so our forgery is universal with known public key attacks. 
3 Conclusions 
Although Shen et al. proposed their efficient construction to propose ID-based 
ring signature schemes, their scheme is insecure against universal forgery.  Moreover, 
Shen et al.’s linkable and convertible ID-based ring signature scheme is also univer-
sally forgeable with known public key attacks.  Our future research is to find the way 
to overcome our forgery.  
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